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That the Quantity Theory is an inadequate explanation of inflation – or is seen to be an 
inadequate explanatiion – has received recent acknowledgment across a wide spectrum 
of economic thought. Thus it has been observed that the LM curve – the relation that 
captures the equality of the demand and supply of money – has evaporated from thinking 
about macroeconomics. 
 
  The LM curve no longer plays any role in serious analysis, having been 
  supplanted by the assumption that the central bank controls the short-term 
  nominal interest rate.  
     Alan  S.  Blinder  (1997)
1 
 
Lucas and his co-authors draw the implications of the Blinder type position for the 
Quantity Theory very plainly. 
 
  A consensus has emerged among practitioners that the instrument of monetary 
  policy ought to be the short-term interest rate, that policy should be focused on 
  the control of inflation, and inflation  can be reduced by increasing short-term 
  interest rates. At the center of this consensus is a rejection of the quantity theory.  
     Lucas  et  al  (2001)   
 
But perhaps the most eloquent testimony to the demise of the Quantity Theory lies in a 
stark, two line statement of the Federal Reserve of the United States of America.   
 
                                                 
1 Blinder adds ‘It is high time we changed our teaching in this way too’.   2
  On March 23, 2006, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
  will cease publication of the M3 monetary aggregate.  
 
     US  Federal  Reserve,  November  10  2005. 
 
To any spectator of the battle over inflation in the 1970s, to traverse the field again after 
30 years is to walk in a landscape of giant, fallen statues. 
 
What might be raised to do service in the place of the Quantity Theory?  
 
One answer is found in an attempt to explain the inflation rate by reference to central 
bank policy regarding nominal interest rates. Here Wicksellian ideas have been revived 
(eg Woodford 2002). In these Wicksellian models the price level is determined by the 
interaction of the return on capital with some rule that governs the nominal rate of 
interest at which the Central Bank supplies money. 
 
But in several important dimensions the Neo-Wicksellian approach remains 
underdeveloped. It is yet to be assimilated outside of readers of academic journals. It is 
uninvestigated empirically. It has been little used in historical investigations of inflation. 
The impression is that neo-Wicksellian approach remains recherché, and as if confined 
behind glass. If the Quantity Theory was massive, granite landmark in the economist’s 
intellectual landscape, the Wicksellian approach is yet to be more than a shimmering 
hologram.  
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It is beyond the aim of this paper to right these shortcomings. But it does aim to assist 
the commencement of their righting by supplying, on the basis of Coleman (2007), a 
simple, tractable statement of a Wicksellian model.   
 
The Wicksellian vision 
The Wicksellian vision is one that turns from supposing that money has the value that 
makes its demand equal to its supply, and towards the supposition that money has the 
value that makes the demand price of credit equal the supply price of credit. This is 
the Wicksellian theory of the value of money. 
 
The Wicksellian model is motivated by the menace posed to the Quantity Theory by the 
conditions of the supply of money in the modern economy. The Quantity Theory 
commonly takes the quantity of outside money as something given by the central bank. 
In truth, the Quantity Critic contends, the modern central bank stands ready to lend, at a 
certain interest rate, whatever amount of money the public wishes to borrow. Rather than 
being ‘given’, M is, ultimately, a matter of the public’s wishes. Rather than the elasticity 
of the supply of M to P being zero, it is infinite. This consideration eviscerates the logic 
of the Quantity Theory. It can no longer be the task of P to equalise the supply and 
demand for money, since no such task need be performed. The central bank always 
supplies whatever amount is demanded. 
 
If we admit the critique as cogent, we are left with a problem: if value of money is no 
longer determined by the demand and supply for money, how is the price level 
determined? 
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This paper outlines a Wicksellian answer to this problem.
2 This Wicksellian solution 
locates price level determination in the credit market, rather than the money market. It 
supposes that the value of money affects both the ‘supply price’ of credit ( = the 
minimum nominal interest rate lenders will accept), and the demand price of credit (= 
the maximum nominal interest rate that borrowers will tolerate), and that the value of 
money adjusts so that the supply price of credit equals the demand price of credit; and 
the rate of interest is no lower than lenders will accept, and no higher than borrowers will 
tolerate. 
 
The Wicksellian theory discards the equality of money demand and money supply as 
having any causal role to play in the determination of P. The Wickellian theory, 
therefore, constitutes a radical alternative to the Quantity Theory, in which the money 
supply disappears from relevance and is replaced by measures of central bank 
willingness to lend. 
 
 The structure of the Wicksellian model 
The common core 
 
In order to focus on the key differences fro the Quantity Theory, the Wicksellian model 
that this paper advances retains almost all the assumptions of a very ‘classical’ Quantity 
Theory. Thus the model this paper advances retains the assumption full employment. It 
accepts a dichotomisation of the economy into real and monetary sectors. It is content 
                                                 
2 The model of this paper borrows its name from Knut Wicksell (1851-1926), whose 
Interest and Prices (1898) supplied the one serious rival to the Quantity Theory. 
Although there are hints of Wicksellianism in the General Theory, it remained largely in 
the mausoleum of ideas until the 1980s.   5
for real money holdings, h, to appear in the utility function. Thus both the Wicksellian 
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 = rate of profit  
     C U =marginal utility of consumption 
     h U =marginal utility of real balances 
    π =rate of inflation 
 
The supply price of credit: the Interest Rate Reaction Function  
 
In only one assumption does the Wicksellian model outlined here differ from the 
Quantity Theory: in the supply of money. The Quantity Theory supposes the nominal 
supply of (‘outside’) money, M, is given. The Wicksellian model, by contrast, supposes 
                                                 
3 The sacrifice of one unit of consumption for the sake of an extra unit of real 
balances this period costs  C U in utility, but  adds  h U  in utility this period, plus the 






.   6
the central bank is willing to lend, on certain terms, the public any amount of (‘outside’) 
money the public wishes to borrow.  
 
But the present modelling of the Wicksellian vision will assume, and this is critical, that 
the terms at which the central bank lends money is not exogenous, but depends on the 
relativity of the actual price level, P, to a ‘reference price level’, PR. The higher the 
excess of P over PR, the higher the interest rate the central bank requires from its 
borrowers.  All that is required is of this relation between the price level and the Central 
bank’s lending rate is that it be continuous and (positively) monotonic. But, purely for 
reasons of convenience, it will be assumed here that the relation is in logs. 
     
    
_
[ln ln ] R ii P P φ =+ −    φ > 0    (0.4) 
 
This is the ‘interest rate reaction function’(IRRF).  
 
_
i  is the ‘benchmark rate of interest’; it is the rate of interest at which the central bank 
supplies money when the price level equals the reference price level ( = the rate of 
interest the central bank settles upon when it has the price level it wants.) φ is the 
response in the interest rate to a proportionate deviation of P from PR. Its magnitude is an 
indicator of the sensitivity of monetary policy. The smaller φ the less sensitive the 
reaction in interest rates.  
 
Four points about the IRRF can be usefully made: 
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•  No optimising rationalisation for the IRRF is here advanced. The IRRF is a 
broadly plausible description of actual central bank behaviour.
4 But the function 
is otherwise taken as a given, just as the nominal money supply is taken as a 
given in the Quantity Theory. 
 
•  The Rule does not make the interest rate a policy instrument, properly speaking. 
The central bank chooses the benchmark interest rate, and PR . But it does not 
choose i. Nevertheless, as φ gets close to zero, the IRRF approaches an interest 
rate peg, as very large variations in P imply on very small changes in i. 
 
•  The IRRF is an interest rate rule. There is nothing left to the central bank’s 
discretion, or judgement. There is nothing to judge. The IRRF could be executed 
automatically.  
 
•  It is assumed that the IRRF is known by all. It is part of market participants’ 
information set. 
 
The deployment of an IRRF in place of a given money supply makes for a difference 
in the causal significance of the three optimisation conditions that both theories share; 
(0.1), (0.2) and (0.3). The Quantity Theory uses the optimisation condition for capital, 
(0.1), and that for money, (0.2), to derive a demand for money function, which it then 
                                                 
4 A reference price level may exist implicitly, even it does not exist explicitly. We 
might imagine, for example, a central bank adjusting the rate of interest in accordance 
with the deviation of the actual price of foreign exchange from some ‘reference’ 
exchange rate. If the actual exchange rate conforms with purchasing power parity then 
the central bank is, without necessarily realising it, adjusting the rate of interest in 
accordance with the deviation of the actual price level from some reference price 
level.   8
equates to a given supply of money. The third optimisation condition (for bonds, 
(0.3)) is disregarded as redundant to the determination of the value of money. The 
Wicksellian model, by contrast, disregards the optimisation condition for money as 
redundant for the determination of the value of money. It instead takes the supply 
price of credit from the IRRF and equates it with a demand price for credit obtained 
from the optimisation conditions for capital, (0.1) and that for bonds (0.3). 
 
The demand price of credit: the Fisher Condition 
 
In turning now from the supply price of credit (the IRRF) towards the demand price for 
credit, we turn from the minimum rate lenders will tolerate, to the maximum rate 
borrowers will accept.  That maximum rate is determined by the equimarginal conditions 
for capital and bonds. Together,  they imply, [1 ] [1 ][1 ] i ρ π + =+ + . Taking logs, 
    
     P P i ln ln 1 − + = ρ   
5   (0.5) 
 
This ‘Fisher Condition’, and gives the maximum rate borrowers will bear.  
 
The Fisher Condition is equally shared by the Quantity and Wicksellian models. But 
they differ on how to interpret the direction of causality in the Condition. 
 
Quantity Theorists suppose causality in the Fisher Condition runs from inflation to the 
rate of interest. Inflation is the independent variable, and the interest rate is the 
                                                 
5  1 ln[1 ] ln[1 ] ln ln iP P ρ += + + − . We are measuring the interest and the profit rate as 
if it was continuously compounded within the period.   9
dependent. The Wicksellian approach allows that there may also be a causal arrow 
running from i to π. In other words, a higher rate of i generates a higher rate of inflation. 
How could this causal arrow be rationalised? By means of an endogeneity in P. A higher 
i must be accompanied by a higher rate of inflation, by the Fisher Condition. But if P1 is 
exogenous, then a higher inflation rate necessitates a fall in P, as a matter of arithmetic. 
So, to illustrate, consider a durable asset that has a price $100 in both the current period 
and the next. Its nominal return is 6 percent, and the interest rate is 6 percent: there is 
equilibrium. But if i rises to 9 percent, then the commodity will be sold off until its price 
has fallen to $97, thereby creating a prospective 3 percent increase in price (and so 
return), that compensates for the 3 percent increase in the rate of interest. 
 
By a parallel logic, the Wicksellian approach also allows a higher ρ to affect π. For a 
given i, a higher ρ must be accompanied by a lower rate of inflation. But if P1 is 
exogenous, a lower inflation rate necessitates a rise in P, as a matter of arithmetic. 
  
In contemplating this reverse causation we glimpse the shape of the Wicksellian theory; 
a higher i spells a lower P, and a higher ρ spells a higher P. Yet such a characterisation 
of the Wicksellian approach is somewhat misleading, given that the interest rate is not 
exogenous in the Wicksellian approach. It is, quite critically, a function of the price 
level. So equilibrium is a matter of simultaneous causation, with caisal arrows pointing 
from i to P, and from P to i. 
 
The equilibrium of the Wicksellian model   10
The equality of the demand price of credit with the supply price of credit. 
Equilibrium requires that the interest rate satisfy both the Fisher Condition and the 
Interest Rate Reaction Function. 
 
i ρ π =+  
_
[ln ln ] R ii P P φ =+ −    1 ln ln P P π = −  (0.6) 
 
Corresponding equalities hold for all other periods 
 
111 i ρ π =+   
_
1 11 , 1 [ln ln ] R ii P P φ =+ −   12 1 ln ln P P π = −  (0.7) 
 
222 i ρ π =+   
_
2 22 , 2 [ln ln ] R ii P P φ =+ −   23 2 ln ln P P π = −  (0.8) 
 
     e t c  
 
The comparative–statics of this system of equilibrium conditions turn on a key 
property of the system of: future endogeneous variables are exogenous with respect to 
current endogeneous variables. This can be seen by noting that P-1 is absent from the 
equilibrium system above. Thus, on the assumption that the above system is 
determinate, we infer that P is completely independent of P-1. That is, P is exogenous 
with respect of P-1 . But if P is exogenous with respect of P-1, then P1 is exogenous 
with respect of P Thus the equalities, 
 
   P P i ln ln 1 − + = ρ   
_
[ln ln ] R ii P P φ =+ −    (0.9) 
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constitute a system of two equations in two unknowns: P and i. The equality on the left 
gives the ‘demand price for credit’. The equality on the right gives the ‘supply price of 
credit’. The equality of these two implies, 
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‘supply price of 
credit’ 
‘demand price of 
credit’   12
It will be observed that in the expression for the price level (0.10), and in Figure 1, the 
money supply is completely absent. The supply of money may still be supposed to equal 
the demand for money, but the requirements of the equality of money demand to money 
supply have nothing to do with the determination of P. Thus a shock to money demand 
have zero impact on P; it will be met by more lending from the central bank. And a 
shock to the money supply a will also have no impact on P. Any helicopter drop of 
money will be unwanted, and used to repay debt to the central bank, or buy assets from 
them. Any helicopter drop of money is the equivalent of cancelling a debt the public 
owes to government. An increase in the autonomous supply of inside money also has no 
affect on P. The public will simply have an excess supply of money, and it will use its 
holdings of outside money to pay off its debts to government.  
 
The Wicksellian model, then, is a model of the price level without a quantity of money. 
The Wicksellian model explains P by means of the reference price level, the benchmark 
interest rate and the future price level. 
 
We will go through these in turn. 
 
A higher reference price level increases P.  
 
The expression for lnP, (0.10) implies, 
 











     (0.11) 
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To increase the reference price level is to increase the actual price level. To give an 
intuition for this result, it is helpful to imagine an adjustment process in which the 
nominal interest rate always equals the ‘supply price’ of credit, but, following a 
disturbance, only equals the ‘demand price’ of credit with a lag,. Equivalently, i always 
is ‘on’ the IRRF, but, following a disturbance, only gets back ‘on’ the Fisher Condition 
with a lag. P, at any period, is pre-determined, but adjusts upwards over time to any 
excess of the return on capital over i. 
 
The increase in P following an increase in PR may be read thus. An increase in PR for a 
given P, reduces P relative to PR. i is reduced, in accordance with the IRRF. But that fall 
in i means the rate of interest is now less than the rate of return on capital. Money is 
borrowed from the central bank in order to buy capital, and the money price of capital 
(and so output) is bid up. But that rise in P induces the central bank to raise rates, in 
accordance with the IRRF. That same rise in P reduces prospective inflation, as a matter 
of arithmetic (as  1 ln ln P P π ≡− ), and so reduces the rate of return on capital. These two 
responses combined restore the equality of the rate of interest to the nominal rate of 
return on capital. 
 
In terms of the Figure the IRRF shifts down. The immediate response is a fall in i, and 
no change in P. This leaves i below the FC. i and P move north-east. 
   14
 
Figure 2: A higher reference price level increases P 
 
By how much will P rise? P will not rise equiproportionately with PR. P is inelastic to PR. 
If P was unit elastic with PR, then i would be unchanged in accordance with the IRRF; 
yet expected inflation would (as a matter of arithmetic) still be reduced by the higher 
price level, leaving the nominal return on capital smaller than i. To preserve equilibrium, 
therefore, P rises by less than PR, and thereby producing a fall in i.  
 
A higher profit rate increases P .  
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An increase in ρ means capital earns a greater nominal rate of return than bonds. So 
profit is made by borrowing money and buying capital. So money is borrowed, and 
capital is bid for. That raises prices. That rise reduces expected inflation as a matter of 
arithmetic, and so helps restore equilibrium. It also induces the central bank to raise i, 
and that also helps restore equilibrium. And so equilibrium is restored. 
 
How much P rises depends on the magnitude of φ. If φ is large - a sensitive IRRF - the 
interest rate is will do ‘most the work’ to restore the equality of to the rate of return on 
capital, and P need barely rise. But if φ  is near zero - an insensitive IRRF- then P ‘does 
most of the work’, and it adjusts upwards so as to engender an expectation of deflation 
almost equal to the increase in the rate of profit. These results are captured in the 
expression for the semi-elasticity of P to ρ, which depends on the magnitude of φ. If φ is 
near zero the semi-elasticity is near one.   16
 
A higher benchmark interest rate reduces P 
 









     (0.13) 
 
Intutively, an increase in the benchmark rate increases i in accordance with the revised 
IRRF. Bonds now offer a higher rate than capital, and capital is sold with the intention of 
lending the proceeds to the central bank. That process reduces P. That reduction in P 
increases prospective inflation, and causes part of the initial increase in i to be reversed, 
and thereby secures an equality between i and the nominal rate on capital. 
 
As φ varies between zero and infinity, the semi-elasticity of P to 
_
i  varies between one 
and zero. 
 
An increase in future prices increases current P.  
 










     (0.14) 
 
Intuitively, an increase in P1 means capital initially outperforms bonds. Capital is bought, 
that raises prices, and that both raises i and reduces prospective inflation, and so restores 
equilibrium. 
   17
Future Shocks 
 
The preceding analysis is incomplete: it begs a question about the determination of P1. 
That question can be answered by the equality of the demand price and supply price of 
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6 φ must be positive in order for the series to converge; an illustration of the necessity for 
φ to be positive.   18
The price level is, evidently, a matter of all reference prices, profit rates and benchmark 
rates, both current and future. Thus any increase in the profit rate – be it in the future as 
well as present- will increase P. An increase in the benchmark rate of interest – be it in 
the future as well as present - will reduce P. An increase in the reference price level – be 
it in the future as well as present - will increase P. 
 
Table 1 gives details. 
  
PR,t  ρt 
_


























  Table 1: Sensitivities of the price level to shocks (elasticity/semi-elasticity). 
 
Table 1 has implications regarding the relative importance of ‘the present’ and ‘the 
future’. A nearer shock is always more significant than a further shock. But as φ 
approaches indefinitely small (that is, as the IRRF approaches an interest rate peg), 
future magnitudes assume an almost equal impact with current ones. The larger φ (the 
more response i) the more ‘present biased’ is price determination. As φ approaches 
infinity, all future variables are irrelevant. 
 
The complete expression for P may be expressed more compactly by using ‘permanent’ 
magnitudes of the reference price level, etc.  
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A compact expression for inflation can be derived using the permanent concepts, 
including a ‘permanent rate of reference inflation’  
 
    
__
** * R = i i ππ ρ ρ + −+ −     (0.22) 
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where
*
R π , the permanent rate of reference inflation, is defined as the hypothetical 
constant rate of reference inflation that has the same ‘present value’ as the ‘present 
value’ of the actual profile of reference inflation rates. 
 












≡    (0.23)   
   
 
The moral of the expression for inflation, (0.23) is that it is the permanent magnitude 
of πR , 
*
R π ,that is significant for inflation. Not this period’s πR . Or next period’s. Or 
any other single period. So, for example, πR may be negative this period, but if the 
permanent rate is positive there will be inflation this period. The moral is that current 
inflation is insensitive to the ambitions of authorities for inflation in the current 
period. It is their ambitions over the long period that counts.  
 
Inspection of (0.23) also reveals that it is the excess of the permanent rate of profit 
over the current rate,
* ρ ρ − , that an creates inflationary pressure. If the tendency of 
future profit rates is to exceed the current profit rate, then prices will rise faster than 
they would other wise. This makes sense. We have learnt a higher profit rate produces 
a higher price level. So if future profit rates are higher than current ones, then future 
prices will be higher than the current one: inflation. Thus it is the trend, or escalation 
in the profit rate, yielding 
* ρ ρ >  , that produces inflation, not the ‘height’ of the profit 
rate. This implies that any change in the profit rate which is permanent has no impact 
on inflation, except in the period in which it occurs.  
   21
Conversely, inspection reveals that it is the excess of the permanent benchmark rate 
over the current benchmark rate that that creates deflationary pressure. Thus if the 
tendency of future benchmark rates is to exceed the current benchmark, rate then 
prices will be falling. We have learnt that a higher benchmark rate produces a lower 
price level. So if future benchmark rates are higher than current ones, then future 
prices are lower than the current one: deflation. Thus it is the trend, or escalation in 
the benchmark rate, yielding 
__
* ii >  , that produces deflation, not the ‘height’ of the 
benchmark rate. Thus any change in the benchmark rate which is permanent has no 
impact on inflation, except in the period in which it occurs. Notice that a permanent 
reduction in the benchmark rate does not create inflation. This underlines the property 
that there is no ‘inflation neutral’ benchmark rate.
7 
 
To try to summarise, if one was to ask ‘Why is there inflation?’, one acceptable answer 
would be to point to three circumstances which are sufficient for inflation: (a) A positive 
trend in the Reference Price Level (other factors unchanging), or (b) a positive trend in 
the rate of profit (other factors unchanging), or (c) a negative trend in the benchmark rate 
of interest (other factors unchanging). 
 
If one was to ask ‘Why is there deflation?’ one answer would be to point to three 
circumstances which are sufficient: (1) An reducing Reference Price Level (other factors 
                                                 
7 Contrary to the view of some central bankers, there is no ‘inflation neutral’ 
benchmark rate: there is no unique benchmark rate that will ensure zero inflation, 
continually over time. There will always be some magnitude of the benchmark rate 
that will secure zero inflation in a given period. But that magnitude will, flukes aside, 
change over time. Nevertheless, the benchmark has a role in securing zero inflation. 
As the later part of the section argues, the disturbances to P from ρ are eliminated if 
the benchmark rate moves in tandem with the profit rate.   22
unchanging) or (b) a continuous reducing the rate of profit (other factors unchanging), or 
(c) a continuous increase in the benchmark rate of interest (other factors unchanging). 
 
A continuous increase in the profit rate, or decrease in the benchmark rate, is unlikely 
to be sustained for long, or to be very large. Thus if we are concerned with ‘secular’ 
rates of inflation it is the reference inflation rate is crucial. Price trends are largely to 
be explained in terms of the change in the Reference Price level. If there is 15 percent 
inflation it is on account of an unwillingness of the central bank to raise the interest rate 
except when prices rise more than 15 percent - and a willingness to reduce them if prices 
rise by less than 15 percent. It is such policy produces an inflation rate of approximately 
15 percent. If there is to be 1 percent inflation the central bank must be willing to raise 
the interest rate as soon as inflation exceeds 1 percent- and lower it as soon as it is less 
than 1 percent. If there is any inflation, it is on account of the central bank unwillingness 
to raise interest rates whenever prices are rising, be it ever so small.  
 
‘Interest and prices’ 
 
We have explored the Wicksellian model’s determination of prices. But the Wicksellian 
model also determines the rate of interest. This determination is worth explicating 
because of the presumption – which is borne out here – that in any Wicksellian model 
the nominal interest rate and the price level are tied up together  
 
The equilibrium expression for the interest rate is, 
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          ( 0 . 2 4 )  
This can be more compactly expressed, 
           
    
__
** * R i =  i i πρ + +−      ( 0 . 2 5 )
8 
 
The expression suggests that, with one exception, it is permanent magnitudes that 
determine the rate of interest. It is the permanent rate of reference inflation that features 
in the expression for i, not reference inflation in the current period. It is permanent 
magnitude of ρ that appears, and not the current magnitude. The moral is purely 
temporary fluctuations in the reference inflation rate or the profit rate are pretty much 
irrelevant to the nominal interest rate; they are swamped by the action of future rates. 
 
However, the nominal interest rate does respond to, and on a one-to-one basis, 
temporary changes in the benchmark rate. Thus the interest rate is smooth (‘sticky’ in 
appearance) save for central bank playing about with benchmark rate.  
 
                                                 
8 We can find the expression for i when all magnitudes are unchanging over time, 
 
 
      R i = ρ π +  
   24
Co-movements and Paradoxes 
 
i and P are so tied up with one another that there is considerable co-movement in the 
interest rate and the price-level, both positive and negative.  
 
 































    Table 2: Relative impacts on P and i of shocks in the Wicksellian model 
 
 
The first row indicates that shocks to the profit rate will push i and P in the same 
direction: upwards, and by the same amount. This one-for-one co-movement means that 
if profit rate shocks were the only shocks then the interest rate and the log of the price 
level would be perfectly ‘correlated’. This is reminiscent of Gibson’s Paradox.
9  
 
The presence of other shocks, however, will spoil any perfect co-movement in prices and 
nominal interest levels. The second row indicates that current shocks to lnPR and 
_
i  will 
shift i and P in opposite directions, by equal amounts.  
 
                                                 
9 Whether this is a plausible explanation is another question. Few economies had 
central banks in the 18
th and 19
th century.   25
However, future shocks to 
_
i  will shift i and P in same directions, and same amount. And 
future shocks to lnPR will shift i and P in the same direction, and by the same amount. 
 














   t  >  =1  (0.26) 
 












     t  >  =1  (0.27) 
 
What then is the impact of permanent changes on i, as compared with the impact of 
permanent changes on P? A permanent increase in rho will i. These contrary future and 
present impacts of benchmark rate balance each other out in that the impact of 
permanent change in benchmark rate will have no impact on i. Similarly for lnPR. 
 
Interest and Price Stability 
The discussion prepares the way for the analysis of the requirements of price stability. 
 
Wicksell contended that price stability requires that the interest rate assume some 
‘right’ level; the nominal rate of interest to equal the rate of profit. For Wicksell’s 
contention to be a prescription for price stability the interest rate must be taken to be a 
policy instrument, and exogenous to prices.
10 As the interest rate is endogenous within 
this model, Wicksell’s prescription cannot be strictly rationalised within this model. 
                                                 
10 Wicksell’s prescription is presumably more than just a restatement of the Fisher 
Hypothesis, that trivially implies an equality of the interest rate and the profit rate 
whenever there is price stability.   26
Nevertheless, the benchmark interest rate is exogenous in the present model, and a 
closely kindred prescription is true. Recall,  
 
    
__
** * R = i i ππ ρ ρ + −+ −     ( 0 . 2 8 )  
 
It can easily be inferred, that atable and zero inflation (and lnP = lnPR) can be secured 
by a double pronged policy; 
 
    , 0 Rt π =  and 
_
t t i ρ =  all t      (0.29)
11 
 
Price stability is secured by the benchmark rate jigging up and down with the rate of 
profit. 
 
Two remarks  
•  The price stabilisation rule implies  
 
     i t = ρt for all t        (0.30) 
 
but this implication should not be considered a prescription. A rule which amounted to 
an injunction to peg the nominal rate at the rate of profit, 
 
                                                 
11 The critical thing is for the benchmark rate to move one-for-one with the profit rate. It 
is not necessary for it equal the profit rate. A stable and zero inflation can also be 
reached by, 
    , 0 Rt π =  and 
_
t t i ρ =  + β    27
     i t = ρt for all t        (0.31) 
 
would not secure price stability. It would imply price-indeterminacy. It is the willingness 
to make i different from ρ, in the face of P diverging from PR, that provides price 
stability.  
 
•  The price stability in no way rests upon the central bank being willing to raise the 
interest rate by so much if P rises so much above the target. All price stability 
requires is that i be raised by some amount if there is any inflation in the current 
period, and increase it again by some amount more next period if there is any 
more inflation the following period, (and increase it yet again by some amount in 
the period after if there is any more inflation the period after,… etc). It is the 




Fact and theory 
The Wicksellian analysis has been motivated in these pages by the more intelligible 
modeling of the money supply process it provides. But the real test of its worth lies 
elsewhere. Does it throw any light of historical episodes of inflation and deflation? Does 
it do this any better than the Quantity Theory?  
                                                 
12 The insignificance of the size of the coefficient of reaction,φ, for the success of the 
price stabilisation rule, might seem to ascribe great power to microscopic increases in 
the benchmark rate of interest. The model implies that a willingness to raise i by, say, 
one hundredth of a percentage point for every 10 percent that P exceeds the stable 
counterfactual is sufficient to ensure price stability. Is this pausible? It may be that in 
the real world a merely minute increase in 
_
i  may throw doubts on the central bank’s 
willingness to persist, and that is critical.   28
 
In evaluating the Wicksellian model’s predictive performance it is helpful to distinguish 
between trend and cycle components of inflation. 
 
The Wicksellian model nominates profit rates and benchmark rates as the leading 
candidates for explaining cyclical movements in inflation. The Wicksellian model 
therefore seems to disregard almost every indicator that has been found useful, or 
thought to have been found useful, as a proximate cause of short run movements in 
prices: scarce inventories, booming commodity prices, falling exchange rates, oil 
shortages, bottlenecks, labour market pressures. The relevance of several of these things 
to inflation is, however, consistent with the Wicksellian emphasis on the profit rate. 
Clearly inventories have a rate of return, and that will be high whenever inventories are 
scarce. Commodities, too, are assets, whose prospective rate return will often be high 
when they have been appreciating in the recent past. It is ‘theoretically possible’ that  
reduction in energy inputs may increase the rate of return on capital. Bottlenecks may 
increase also the rate of return on capital, as whole, and thereby be inflationary by the 
account of Wicksellian theory. Technical change may simultaneous increase the demand 
for labour (‘labour market pressure’) and, critically, capital. Even more definitely in 
favour of Wicksellianism capacity is the tendency for inflation to drop in a recession, as 
rates of return drop. 
 
Trend movements in inflation are much less easily explained by profit rates and 
benchmark rates, as they themselves must have a trend in order to explain a trend. The 
Wicksellian resource for explaining the trend inflation is in the trend in the reference 
price level. So, to illustrate, the Wicksellian explanation of the end of the Great Inflation   29
of the 1970s is that the reference price level increased more quickly than it did in the 
1960s; the actual price level, in other words, could rise more quickly than it did before 
without the Central Banks raising the interest rate.
13 And the Wicksellian explanation of 
the end Great Inflation was decline in the rate of reference price inflation: the actual 
price level, in other words, could no longer rise so quickly as before without the Central 
Banks raising the interest rate. In Wicksellian conception, the unexpectedly high interest 
rates of Paul Volker’s chairmanship of the federal reserve signaled that. 
 
But is there any evidence that the reference price level increased more quickly in the 
1970s? A great difficulty in answering that question is that in being a behavioral 
parameter, and not a ‘thing’ (as the money supply is), the reference price level is difficult 
to observe – and has not been observed. One response would be to brave the difficulties 
and seek to gather observations, even if the ‘observations’ can be no more than ‘soft 
data’. For example, a monetary authority’s prediction of inflation, that is unaccompanied 
by predictions of higher interest rates, might be taken to be a report of the rate of 
increase in the reference price level. Any announced ‘inflation target’ may be even more 
readily identified with the rate of increase in the reference price level, as long as no 
change in the interest rate is foreshadowed.  
 
Another way of assessing whether the reference price level increased more rapidly in the 
1970s would be to see if the central bank’s behaviour changed in this decade: if the 
interest rate chosen in response to the price level changed. Was there, in other words, a 
                                                 
13 It is not necessary for the success of the hypothesis to suppose Central Banks thought 
in terms of a relation between the interest rate and the price level. The institutional 
arrangement might have led them to act according to such a relation. A commitment, for 
example, to a fixed exchange rate and unchanged interest rate in the face of imported 
inflation is, in effect, a decision to let the reference price level inflate more rapidly.   30
structural shift in the interest rate reaction function? Such an inquiry would be easier if 
the reference price level was thought to have undergone a one-off shift upwards in level 
in the 1970s. Such a one-off shift in level would be manifested as a change in the 
constant term in the interest rate reaction function, and a change in a constant term can 
be assessed by standard methods. But the Wicksellian hypothesis of the Great Inflation 
is, surely, that the rate of increase in reference price level increased. Under this 
hypothesis there is no constant term in the interest rate reaction function, but instead an 
(unobserved) exogenous variable (the reference price level) increasing according to a 
(possibly variable)  trend. Nevertheless, the Wicksellian hypothess might be still be 
investigated by treating the interest rate as a function of the ‘trend adjusted price level’- 
the price level deflated by the trend of price level – which could be used a proxy for the 
reference price level. One might estimate a reaction function, on the basis of that proxy, 
for the 1950s and 1960s, and investigate how well it performs out of sample in the 
1970s. If it overpredicts the actual interest rate in the 1970s, then one might infer there 
was a ‘loosing in interest rate policy’ in the 1970s; in other words the interest rate in the 
1970s was not raised in circumstances where in previous decades it would have been.  
 
It is not obvious that there was a ‘loosening of interest rate policy’ in the 1970s. Interest 
rates were much higher than the 1960s. But this surely reflects the operation of the 
Fisher Hypothesis, which is also an integral part of the Wicksellian model. We are 
confront, then, the problem that in the Wicksellian model both the interest rate and the 
price level are endogenous variables, and trying to estimate a reaction function in the 
context of this endogeneity is beset with difficulty. 
   31
We are left with estimating reduced form equation for the price level, but still beleagured 
by the unbservability of the reference price level. Nevertheless proxies might be 
advanced to allow the investigation of the implication of the Wicslsellian model that the 
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